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ERIE'S STARTING POINTS: THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF DEFAULT
RULES IN STRUCTURING CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS
Allan Erbsen*
Abstract
This contribution to a symposium marking the seventy-fifth anniver-
sary of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins is part of a larger project in
which I seek to demystify a decision that has enchanted, entangled, and
enervated commentators for decades. In prior work I contended that the
"Erie doctrine" is a misleading label encompassing four distinct inquiries
that address the creation, interpretation, and prioritization of federal law and
the adoption of state law when federal law is inapplicable. This article
builds from that premise to argue that courts pursuing Erie's four inquiries
would benefit from default rules that establish initial assumptions and struc-
ture judicial analysis. Considering the potential utility of default rules leads
to several conclusions that could help clarify and improve decisionrmaking
under Erie. First, courts deciding whether a state rule has priority over a
conflicting judge-made federal rule in diversity cases should default to fed-
eral law despite the intuitive appeal of state law. Second, when courts are
considering whether to create federal common law, the proponent of a fed-
eral solution should bear the burden of persuasion. Third, the Supreme
Court should replace the rule from Klaxon v. Stentor Electric, which re-
quires federal courts to identify applicable nonfederal law by using the fo-
rum state's choice of law standards, with a default rule that favors forum
standards while authorizing federal choice of law standards in appropriate
circumstances. Reconsidering how federal courts choose applicable non-
federal laws would also provide an opportunity to reconcile Klaxon's
irrebuttable preference for intrastate uniformity with the more flexible de-
fault rule in United States v. Kimbell Foods, which requires courts crafting
federal common law to incorporate state standards unless there is a good
reason to create nationally uniform standards. Finally, courts should devel-
op a default rule-which one might label an "Erie canon"-to determine
whether federal statutes and rules should be interpreted broadly or narrowly
to embrace or avoid conflict with otherwise applicable state laws.
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Michael Greve, Jill
Hasday, Kim Roosevelt, and participants in the American Enterprise Institute Colloquium on Erie for
helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
The successive anniversaries of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' have
an eerie similarity. At each major milestone, commentators extol the deci-
sion's importance while grappling with its inscrutability. Within a "few
short years" of Erie's birth, Judge Charles Clark observed that the decision
"suggested at least as many questions as it has answered."2 On its twenty-
fifth anniversary, Judge Henry Friendly, speaking in the same endowed
lecture series as had Judge Clark, felt a need to defend Erie from a "new
spate of attacks" by scholars challenging its reasoning.' On its fiftieth an-
niversary, scholars again reconsidered doctrinal confusion that arose in the
wake of Erie's "vagaries."4 Now, in this symposium marking Erie's seven-
ty-fifth anniversary, the next generation gathers to decipher both the deci-
sion and its progeny.
The academy's fascination with Erie is understandable because the
opinion's reach is unavoidable. At a high of level of abstraction, Erie
touches some of the most interesting questions of constitutional law. It
implicates the allocation of power between the federal and state govern-
ments. It addresses the division of lawmaking authority among federal in-
stitutions. And it even contemplates the nature of law itself, raising ques-
tions about where legal rules originate and what makes them authoritative.
Yet despite being about so many things, Erie says almost nothing.
Justice Brandeis's opinion is notorious for addressing weighty questions
with minimal analysis and minimal support. The opinion cites "the Consti-
tution," but not any specific clause.' The decision invokes principles of
federalism and separation of powers, but does not elaborate on their role or
significance. The holding repudiates decades of prior precedent, but does
not mark a clear path for the decades to follow. Unsurprisingly, courts and
commentators have struggled to apply the skeletal decision to the myriad
circumstances that it potentially encompasses.
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946).
3 Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383, 384 (1964). Both Friendly and Clark were delivering the annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture to
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See id. at 383.
4 Stephen P. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 700 (1988); see also Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year:
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 692 (1988)
("[W]e should not be surprised if, in the next fifty years, [holdings building on Erie] do not come easily,
but only after some confusion.").
5 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80 ("We merely declare that in applying the doctrine [of Swif v. Tyson] this




This article will focus on one dimension of the ongoing struggle to
implement Erie: the need to develop default rules that can provide a helpful
starting point for judicial analysis. This discussion is part of a larger project
in which I seek to demystify the Erie doctrine by exploring its assumptions
and mechanics. In an earlier article, I explained that confusion surrounding
Erie stems in large part from the fact that the name "Erie" is a label encom-
passing four distinct inquiries.' Fragmenting Erie into these four compo-
nents helps clarify the unique role that each plays in regulating choice of
law within a federal system.' A subsequent article will address how this
more granular account of Erie's four inquiries undermines a central pillar of
current Erie jurisprudence: the "twin aims"8 test that governs conflicts be-
tween state law and judge-made federal law.9 The project's goal is to show
that a seemingly opaque and ethereal doctrine is really an amalgam of rela-
tively familiar and manageable concepts. Revealing these dimensions of
Erie can help structure judicial analysis and highlight competing values that
might guide judicial discretion.
Part I identifies Erie's four components and discusses the potential
utility of using default rules to guide courts considering each distinct in-
quiry. Part II discusses specific potential defaults. These defaults might
help in determining when federal procedural common law preempts state
law, when federal courts can create federal common law, how federal
courts should interpret the scope of ambiguous federal statutes, and whether
federal courts should revisit the Klaxon rule that governs choice of law in
diversity cases.'° Default rules can clarify implementation of Erie and sug-
gest avenues for future scholarship developing Erie's normative foundation
and refining its analytical components.
I. THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF DEFAULT RULES IN STRUCTURING ERIE
ANALYSIS
Understanding why default rules might improve decisionmaking under
Erie requires understanding what decisionmaking under Erie actually en-
tails. The jurisprudence that has come to be known as the Erie doctrine is
better understood as a composite of four distinct inquiries addressing the
creation, interpretation, and prioritization of federal law and the adoption
6 See Allan Erbsen, Erie's Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Erbsen, Four Functions].
7 See infra Part I (identifying Erie's four components).
8 Hanna v. Plunmer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
9 See Allan Erbsen, Erie and the Problem of Pedigree: Rethinking the Second-Class Status of
Federal Procedural Common Law (unpublished work in progress on file with author) [hereinafter
Erbsen, Pedigree].
10 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts
adjudicating nonfederal questions in diversity cases must apply the forum state's choice of law rules).
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of nonfederal law. These four inquiries partially overlap and have subtle
dimensions that I have explored in detail elsewhere." The following nut-
shell summary outlines the basic framework.
The creation inquiry considers whether a particular institution can be
an authoritative source of binding federal law given the facts of a pending
case. Common questions implicating Erie's creation component include
whether federal courts can rely on federal common law and whether Con-
gress may preempt state law. Even if a federal actor can create a binding
rule, the rule may apply in federal court only if an issue falls within the
rule's scope. Identifying that scope implicates Erie's interpretation inquiry.
Relevant questions include whether the federal rule creates rights, remedies,
or both; whether it addresses collateral issues such as pleading standards
and limitation periods; and whether it seeks to displace state law or merely
to supplement state law. If a federal rule is valid and encompasses a dis-
puted issue, there is still a question about whether the federal rule should
trump inconsistent state law. Erie's prioritization inquiry determines when,
if ever, federal law must yield to state law in a system where federal law is
generally "supreme."' 2 Finally, Erie's adoption inquiry is relevant when
federal law does not apply, such that the court must determine the source
and content of binding nonfederal rules.
Each of these four inquiries serves distinct purposes by considering
distinct factors in light of distinct values. But what purposes, what factors,
and what values? These questions have befuddled courts and commentators
for seventy-five years. This article suggests that recurring questions might
become more manageable if courts can identify a useful starting point for
each of Erie's four inquiries. Default rules can potentially supply such
starting points.
The need to develop default assumptions to guide Erie's four inquiries
becomes apparent when one distinguishes Erie's relevance as a source of
general principles about the structure of government from its relevance as a
source of rules that judges apply in particular cases. As a source of princi-
ples, Erie permeates constitutional law addressing federalism and separa-
tion of powers. Almost any interesting constitutional question touches Erie
at some level of abstraction. Yet as a source of rules for courts to follow,
Erie applies much less frequently. Most choice of law questions are easy,
obviating formal Erie analysis. One can say that Erie is still relevant in
easy cases, but only in the sense that all Supreme Court decisions establish-
ing the basic structure of judicial power-such as Marbury3 and Martin'4-
'1 See Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6.
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
14 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816) (establishing that the Supreme
Court could review state court decisions applying federal law).
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are always relevant to judicial decisionmaking. Caselaw supports the lim-
ited need for applying Erie to specific disputes: while courts seem to cite
Erie often, these citations in fact occur in only a tiny fraction of all federal
cases, and even of all diversity cases. 5
Given that Erie helps courts resolve only a small number of cases each
year, courts need guidelines for when to invoke it. Once Erie is deemed
relevant, guidelines are again necessary to implement Erie's various inquir-
ies.
Default rules can be a helpful source of guidance. 6 Courts might as-
sume that a particular Erie inquiry is never necessary absent some trigger-
ing concern or that the inquiry is always necessary in a particular context.
When an inquiry is necessary, defaults might influence which questions
courts ask and which factors shape the answers. As Part II illustrates, de-
fault assumptions will differ for each of Erie's four components.
The concept of a "default rule" is laden with baggage because different
areas of law reference defaults for different purposes. Common invocations
of default rules envision decisionmaking by at least two actors: an actor
who creates the default and an actor who reacts to it.'7 For example, in con-
tract law, emphasis on default rules often arises from the parties' ability to
establish or reallocate legal entitlements through bargaining. A legislature
or court can create defaults to set a baseline that shapes negotiations and
15 For example, 678 opinions dated from October 2010 to September 2011 in Westlaw's DCT
database cite Erie (based on a search on Aug. 24, 2013). Many of these citations involve little or no
discussion. Only 158 opinions mention Erie at least twice and 64 mention Erie at least three times. Yet
289,252 civil cases were filed in the district courts in the same period, including 101,366 diversity cases.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 125 (2012) (the report also tabulates the number of
pending-as opposed to newly commenced-civil cases, but does not separately identify diversity
cases). Even accounting for the fact that many cases do not yield opinions, that many opinions are not
available on Westlaw, and that some courts cite Erie's progeny without citing Erie itself, discussions of
Erie appear in only a small fraction of opinions. In contrast, District Courts cite other decisions much
more frequently. A Westlaw search for the same time period reveals, for example, more than 15,000
citations to the Court's revision of pleading standards in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16 Commentators typically do not address Erie from the perspective of default assumptions. The
only article extensively considering default rules under Erie focuses on different issues than those I
consider here. See Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573
(2012) (contending that state and federal procedural law supply competing "defaults" for enforcing
entitlements, that Erie requires choosing between these enforcement mechanisms, and that the choice
can involve setting a default rule that encourages state and federal lawmakers to clarify the relationship
between procedural and substantive law). My approach here addresses different concerns because it
neither relies on distinguishing substance from procedure nor attempts to identify specific types of state
rules that should apply in federal court. Instead, my analysis of defaults focuses on assumptions that
provide a starting point for each of Erie's four inquiries.
17 An actor can wear both the rule-maker and rule-receiver hats simultaneously. For example, two
parties might negotiate an agreement that creates waivable defaults governing their relationship. Each
party would thus be the source of and target for a particular default.
2013]
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fills gaps in agreements. 8 This private law model of defaults has rough
analogues in public law. For example, some constitutional doctrines-such
as the Miranda rule requiring warnings to suspects before custodial interro-
gation as a condition for admitting subsequent testimony -- incentivize
government actors to behave in particular ways without compelling them to
do so.2° The rule functions as a default with an unattractive but available
opt-out mechanism.2' Similarly, regulatory agencies can promulgate default
rules that actors may modify if they are willing to accept other burdens,
such as providing information to the agency or redirecting their pursuits
along paths that the agency prefers.22
I am using the concept of default rules in a different sense than the
conventional account above. Rather than encouraging courts to develop
rules that induce a reaction from actors outside the judiciary,23 I envision
default rules as a starting point for judicial implementation of a potentially
difficult inquiry. The equally familiar phrase "rebuttable presumption"
could replace "default rule."24 However, a reference to presumptions may
be misleading because in some contexts defaults and presumptions are dis-
tinct. Defaults embody "substantive principle[s]" that animate analysis,
while presumptions sometimes address the "evidentiary effect" of findings
18 See generally Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121
YALE L.J. 2032 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Con-
sent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
20 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 459-65 (1998) (contending that Miranda established a "default" that could have
but ultimately did not encourage "democratic experimentalism"); John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman,
Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 851 (2006)
(characterizing Miranda as a "model default" because it establishes a template for how actors should
behave).
21 Legislatures can also opt-out ofjudicially created default rules if members can agree on a viable
alternative. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 792-93 (2006) (observing that "constitutional defaults" can inspire legislative action by creating a
judicial baseline that at least some legislative factions will find unattractive, leading to a statutory com-
promise that displaces the default).
22 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 75, 80-84 (2008).
23 An example of a judicially created default rule designed to influence other actors is Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which created
a framework for analyzing presidential authority that in turn helped frame negotiations between the
executive and legislative branches. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2354 n. 189 (2006) (analogizing Youngstown to a .'preference-
eliciting' . . . default rule" of statutory interpretation) (quoting Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2165 (2002)).
24 See Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 469, 491 (2006) (stating that "a
default rule is no more than a rebuttable presumption-the mere beginning of the inquiry").
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based on those principles. 25 The terminology of defaults rather than pre-
sumptions thus seems more helpful when discussing choice of law, but the
concept is more important than the label. The key point is that the sorts of
default rules that I discuss would emanate from the judiciary as a form of
self-discipline rather than as an effort to alter the behavior of entities affect-
ed by decisions, with one exception: in Part II.D, I discuss default rules of
interpretation that might influence how lawmakers craft rules.
Thinking about defaults as starting points highlights how a court im-
plementing Erie can use defaults to skew its analysis toward favored out-
comes unless there is a good context-specific reason to believe that an al-
ternative outcome is preferable. Such skewing would of course need a jus-
tification, so a default's legitimacy would hinge on its fidelity to Erie's
underlying values. To the extent that those values have a constitutional
foundation, defaults would be a form of constitutional common law. 6 If
portions of Erie lack a constitutional foundation, then the relevant defaults
would be a federal common law gloss on what is essentially a federal com-
mon law doctrine.27
Relying on default rules as starting points for the implementation of
public law doctrine can produce a wide variety of benefits. First, default
rules can prioritize assumptions that are empirically likely to be valid. The-
se defaults promote efficiency by avoiding wasteful analysis of unlikely
scenarios absent a case-specific reason to believe that such analysis is nec-
essary. For example, the "presumption of regularity" in administrative
decisionmaking is in effect a default rule that obviates scrutiny of agency
behavior absent an unlikely reason to think that the behavior is relevant.28
Second, defaults can mitigate confusion by providing structure to compli-
cated doctrinal inquiries. A court that knows where to begin its analysis
and which factors are persuasive is on a clearer path to a justifiable result
than a court engaged in a relatively free-form inquiry.29 Third, focusing
judicial attention on defaults can highlight conflict between values that
might otherwise be resolved without reflection. ° Finally, defaults allocate
and define the burden of persuasion, which can facilitate resolving close
cases consistently with normative commitments. Familiar examples in con-
25 Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Em-
ployment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 93, 109 (2009).
26 For discussion of how common law acquires constitutional undertones, see Henry P. Mona-
ghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
27 For discussion of why Erie might be understood as having preconstitutional or
extraconstitutional foundations, see Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6; Craig Green, Can Erie Sur-
vive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813 (2013).
28 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (listing
grounds for rebutting the presumption).
29 Canons of interpretation serve a similar function. See infra Part lI.D.
30 See Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 20, at 838 (contending that "explicit attention" to select-
ing defaults "might improve the quality of constitutional decisionmaking").
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stitutional law are tiers of scrutiny that raise the hurdles a challenged rule
must overcome in proportion to the importance of burdened rights.3'
Default rules thus can in theory help courts implement Erie's four dis-
tinct inquiries. The next question is whether particular defaults might be
sensible in practice.
II. POTENTIAL DEFAULTS FOR ERIE'S FOUR COMPONENTS
Among the benefits of fragmenting Erie into its four components is
that courts and commentators can separately analyze the default assump-
tions that should guide each distinct inquiry rather than jumbling them into
a confusing morass. This part briefly sketches potential defaults for each
component in order to highlight overlooked dimensions of Erie and to raise
questions for further study.
A. Prioritization: A Counterintuitive Preference for Federal Law
Suppose that a federal court sitting in diversity confronts a question for
which federal and state law seem to provide conflicting answers. The court
must determine which answer has priority. One might think that priority is
obvious under the Supremacy Clause: federal law will apply because it is
"supreme."32 On this view, Erie's prioritization inquiry is merely a rote
formality because the creation and interpretation inquiries do all of Erie's
real work when state and federal law conflict. Once a problem falls within
the scope of a valid federal law, the Supremacy Clause obviates inquiry into
whether that federal law must yield to state law.
However, a quirk of modem Erie jurisprudence is that courts do not
always treat the prioritization inquiry as a simple formality. Instead, resolv-
ing a conflict between state law and a "federal judge-made law"-in con-
trast to a federal "statute or Rule"-requires considering empirical and pol-
icy questions related to Erie's "twin aims. '"' I critique this rule elsewhere,
contending that the prioritization inquiry should always favor a valid feder-
al law that actually addresses a disputed question, regardless of the federal
31 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455-56 (2002) (Souter J.,
dissenting) (observing that "strict scrutiny leaves few survivors" because regulations must be
"necess[ary]" to protect a "compelling governmental interest," while "intermediate scrutiny" imposes a
"comparatively softer" requirement that regulations be "narrowly tailored" to promote a "significant"
interest) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
33 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (identifying the "the twin aims of the Erie rule" as "discouragement
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws").
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law's source. 4 But for present purposes I will assume that courts are cor-
rect in holding that Erie requires considering the relative priority of state
law and judge-made federal law. The issue then becomes: could defaults
help guide that inquiry?
One can imagine three potential starting points for a prioritization in-
quiry. Federal courts might: (1) by default apply federal law unless Erie
requires applying state law; (2) by default apply state law unless Erie justi-
fies applying federal law; or (3) avoid selecting a default, so that the choice
between federal and state law would require an Erie analysis in every
case.
35
We can quickly dispense with the third option-no defaults-because
it is inefficient. As discussed below, most prioritization questions are easy.
This observation suggests that the no-defaults option is wasteful because
tediously implementing a multifactor Erie test would not alter the outcome
in most cases. Courts can simply assume that either federal or state law
applies (depending on which default they adopt) and depart from that as-
sumption with minimal effort when circumstances warrant. In these easy
cases, either default should produce the same result.
The two remaining options--defaulting to federal or state law-should
in theory reach the same result if the adversarial system functions as intend-
ed. If the parties are diligent, they will notice subtle prioritization prob-
lems, bring them to the court's attention, and raise all relevant arguments
favoring both state and federal law. Wise judges will then carefully parse
competing arguments and reach the optimal result. Either state or federal
law should always have a stronger claim of authority over a particular issue
on which they conflict, and that priority will become apparent through the
application of Erie. Even if arguments for state and federal law seem
34 See Erbsen, Pedigree, supra note 9.
35 The parties could attempt to modify the prioritization default by including a choice of law
clause in a contract. But that clause would not obviate analysis of which law governed enforcement of
the contract, which in turn requires a prioritization inquiry. For example, suppose that a federal court
adjudicating a diversity case in Texas must decide whether state or federal law governs a particular
procedural issue. The court initially concludes that federal law has priority. Now further suppose that
the court learns of a contract between the parties specifying that California law will govern the proce-
dural issue. The contract would seem to resolve the prioritization inquiry by selecting state law over
federal law and then by selecting California law over Texas law. However, the contract's choice of law
clause would be relevant only if it is enforceable. State law ordinarily would govern enforcement of the
clause. See MidAmerica Constr. Mgmt. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 436 F.3d 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006)
("[W]here subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, federal courts must look to the
forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine the effect of a contractual choice-of-law clause."). How-
ever, if the clause conflicts with an otherwise applicable federal rule, there would still be a question
about whether the federal rule preempts private agreements. If the federal rule would be preemptive
then the contract would not override the court's initial determination that federal law has priority. For a
discussion of when and how parties can contract around otherwise applicable federal procedural rules,
see Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507
(2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011).
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equally balanced, such that allocating the burden of persuasion might mat-
ter, a "tie" is impossible because the Supremacy Clause presumably tips the
scale in favor of federal law.36
This faith (again, in theory) that judges can successfully parse difficult
prioritization problems does not mean that the Erie inquiry is objective-it
clearly is not.37 Instead, the point is that in idealized conditions a judge
should reach the same result regardless of the starting default because the
default becomes irrelevant once all arguments are on the table and fully
understood.
In practice, however, defaults are extremely important. First, one can-
not assume that courts will notice latent prioritization issues. Choice of law
inhabits a foreboding comer of the legal landscape that many judges and
lawyers seem to dread and often overlook, leading them to miss subtle Erie
problems.38 In these tricky cases where courts overlook conflicts of law, the
default law becomes the operative law without any scrutiny. Second, even
when courts notice prioritization issues, the difficulty of applying Erie to
close cases creates a risk of weak or misguided reasoning.39 Difficult cases
also create a risk that a default will be sticky-the default law will apply by
inertia absent a compelling reason to apply a different law. To the extent
that default rules might channel this reasoning in a specific direction,
choosing the appropriate default is important. But which default is superi-
or?
Choosing an appropriate prioritization default requires favoring one
kind of troubling error over another. Competing default rules would skew
the risk of error toward incorrectly applying federal law or incorrectly ap-
plying state law. Both types of error are troubling. Federal law should not
exceed the limited bounds of its authority, but neither should state law in-
36 The Supremacy Clause arguably does more than resolve ties; it creates a definitive rule priori-
tizing federal law, further justifying a default favoring federal law. See Erbsen, Pedigree, supra note 9.
In some cases, federal and state law might be identical. This lack of conflict obviates choosing between
them absent a reason to care, such as a need to determine if a claim "arises under" federal law for juris-
dictional purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); cf Graves v. BP Am., Inc., 568 F.3d 221, 223 (5th Cir.
2009) ("This [diversity] case does not require us to decide the choice-of-law issue because ... federal
and state law dovetail to provide the same outcome.").
37 The choice of law inquiry under Erie is less subjective than under the prior regime, which
permitted courts to search far and wide for suitable governing rules. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19
(1842) ("The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the languages of Cicero,
adopted by Lord MANSFIELD... to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of
the commercial world."). But modem doctrine still leaves room for judicial discretion due to its impre-
cise methods for interpreting and characterizing federal and state rules.
38 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TULANE L. REV. 1087, 1108 (1989)
(noting that "[r]emarkably," some district courts have "failed even to recognize" recurring Erie prob-
lems regarding enforcement of forum selection clauses). A similar phenomenon is evident on law
school exams, where subtly disguised Erie issues have been the bane of countless students.
39 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 3 (2000)
(observing that Erie has been "widely misunderstood").
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fringe that authority." The key question is: which error is preferable in the
context of Erie's prioritization inquiry? Three factors suggest that a default
favoring federal law is preferable.
First, federal courts in diversity cases spend the vast majority of their
time applying federal law, especially as a case progresses.' The daily grind
of motions and fact development primarily implicates federal rules govern-
ing practice, such as pleading, discovery, evidence, and case management. 2
Defaulting to state law in diversity cases would therefore be inefficient giv-
en the ubiquity of federal law in federal court.
Second, a default favoring federal law is unlikely to suppress im-
portant state interests because state laws that should apply in federal court
under Erie are likely to stand out. These laws typically create and limit
rights to sue, remedies, and defenses, so at least one of the parties will have
an incentive to bring them to the court's attention. In most cases, the priori-
tization issue will be easy, as in Erie itself, where state law obviously de-
termined a railroad's duty of care once the Court rejected the existence of
"federal general common law."43 In rare cases where the prioritization issue
is difficult, a default to federal law still provides ample opportunity for the
parties to convince a judge that state law should apply.'
Third, to the extent that a default favoring federal law tips the scales
against state law, that result is normatively defensible. As the prior discus-
sion indicates, the scale tipping occurs in only two scenarios: where the
parties and court do not notice that state law should apply or when compet-
ing arguments favoring state law and federal law are difficult to resolve. In
both scenarios, a rebuttable preference for federal law is defensible.
To see why a federal law default is normatively sound, recall the dis-
tinction between Erie's creation, interpretation, and prioritization compo-
nents. The creation component prevents federal courts from inventing fed-
eral rules absent a source of constitutional, legislative, or inherent authority.
40 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving power to states), with U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2
(federal law is "supreme").
41 The calculus is different early in a case, when a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
might rely primarily on questions of state law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, the relevance of
state law is likely to be obvious when adjudicating most motions to dismiss, such that a default favoring
federal law will not skew a court's choice of law decision from the correct result. See infra text accom-
panying note 43.
42 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (describing a "shift in the focus of federal litigation
to the pretrial phase").
43 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). State law thus had priority in the sense that
there was no potentially applicable federal law capable of displacing state law. In Erie, the only ques-
tion on remand concerned the content of state law. See id. at 80.
44 Courts would need a standard for evaluating competing arguments about which law has priori-
ty. Determining the content of that standard is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on wheth-
er the proponent of state or federal law should have the burden of persuasion under whatever standard
controls the prioritization inquiry.
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The interpretation component prevents federal courts from applying federal
rules to issues beyond their scope. But the prioritization component as-
sumes that a given issue is within the scope of a valid federal rule. So the
only remaining inquiries are whether the issue is also within the scope of a
valid state rule and, if so, which rule has priority. In effect, the question is
whether the state rule displaces the otherwise applicable federal rule. 5
Framing the prioritization problem in terms of displacing a valid and
otherwise applicable federal rule raises a new question: if nobody would
otherwise notice that state law might apply, or the arguments favoring state
law are roughly equal to the arguments favoring federal law, why should
federal courts default to state law? The state's interests presumably are not
dispositive-otherwise the arguments for applying state law would be more
apparent and stronger.46 Federal interests favoring federal law presumably
are strong because of federal judges' expertise in applying federal law and
the general desire for uniform procedural rules in federal court (even if ju-
dicial discretion renders uniformity elusive in practice). 7 Comity concerns
45 Blurring Erie's distinct components can lead to confusion. For example, Donald Doemberg has
contended, contrary to my analysis below, that the default rule in Erie cases implicating "vertical
choice-of-law" should be that "state law applies." Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie
Railroad: Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109
W. VA. L. REV. 611, 645 (2007) [hereinafter Doemberg, Unseen Track]; see also Donald L. Doemberg,
"The Tempest, " 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1151 n.26 (2011) ("viewing the applicability of state law as
the default rule makes a good beginning point for accurate Erie analysis"). He supports that conclusion
by citing the limited scope of federal power under Article 1, which determines what subjects Congress
may regulate but does not directly control interpretation of a valid statute's scope. See Doemberg,
Unseen Track, supra, at 645. Doemberg therefore seems to be proposing a default rule addressing the
creation of federal law rather than prioritization of an otherwise valid federal law. If so, then he and I
may agree on the optimal content of default rules despite the apparent disagreement. See infra Part ll.B
(discussing my proposed default for Erie's creation component).
46 Even when Erie issues are not apparent, altering the default rule to favor state law might not
make the application of state law more likely. For example, Adam Steinman has suggested that state
law should supply the summary judgment standard for diversity cases. See Adam N. Steinman, What Is
the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 301-02 (2008). If this argument is correct, then courts are routinely over-
looking an important Erie issue. Yet courts presumably would overlook this issue even if the default
rule favored state law because the prevailing view of Erie posits that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure should apply in diversity cases. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). The problem
therefore is not that a default rule is obscuring a potential Erie issue, but rather that current accounts of
Erie do not deem the issue to be difficult. A new approach to summary judgment in diversity cases
would therefore require a new understanding of Erie's requirements rather than a new default. Cf
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1413-14 (1997) (noting that Erie
generates assumptions about federal and state power that persist until "contestation within a certain
discourse undermines the authority of an earlier practice or claim").
47 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989) ("Proponents of the Enabling Act and of the original
Federal Rules sold both on the promise that uniform federal procedure would be superior to federal
procedure under the Conformity Act of 1872, which yielded a melange of state and federal law....
[However,] it would be hard to call federal procedure uniform today. The Federal Rules may appear
[VOL. 10:1
2013] ERIE'S STARTING POINTS
might in theory justify deferring to state law.4" But those concerns seem
misplaced in diversity cases because the mistrust of state courts partially
underlying the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction is the antithesis
of comity.49 Indeed, this mistrust might justify favoring federal law in close
cases if state law would undermine national interests.5°
The three arguments above suggest that the optimal default rule for
Erie's prioritization component is that federal courts should apply federal
law-assuming a valid and applicable federal law exists-unless analysis
under Erie requires applying state law." When there is a good reason to
think that state law should displace federal law, the default can be over-
come. In this way, courts devote time to Erie's prioritization inquiry only
when the court or a party identifies a choice of law problem that requires
further scrutiny.52
uniform, but many of them merely empower district judges to make ad hoc decisions."); cf .Grable &
Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (noting in the context of
upholding jurisdiction over federal questions embedded in state claims the "experience, solicitude, and
hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues").
48 Comity is typically a rationale for federal judicial deference to state interests when the question
is whether a federal court should defer to or abstain in favor of a state proceeding, rather than whether it
should apply state law. See Michael L. Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60
N.C.L. REV. 59 (1981). However, before Erie, the Court sometimes invoked comity as a justification
for deferring to decisions by state courts when important federal interests were not at stake. See, e.g.,
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335, 339 (1934) ("The summum jus of power, whatever it may
be, will be subordinated at times to a benign and prudent comity. At least in cases of uncertainty we
steer away from a collision between courts of state and nation when harmony can be attained without
the sacrifice of ends of national importance.").
49 See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed.
2009) ("It is unclear what prompted the concern about the inadequacy of or bias in the state courts and
whether it was justified."). For a discussion of whether Erie issues should be treated differently depend-
ing on whether they arise through supplemental rather than diversity jurisdiction, see Erbsen, Four
Functions, supra note 6.
50 See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After
the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1855 (2006) (criticizing Klaxon's preference
for forum rather than federal choice of law rules because it "weakens one of diversity jurisdiction's core
purposes in protecting out-of-state litigants from in-state bias"); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Col-
lins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 625 n.38 (1999) (noting
possibility that the Diversity Clause may originally have been understood to provide not just "a neutral
forum, but also neutral laws").
51 The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012), does not create a contrary default. See
Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6 (discussing the Act's opaque and apparently circular text).
52 State courts take a similar approach when adjudicating interstate cases by assuming that local
law applies absent a reason to consider rules from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gleim v. Roberts, 919
N.E.2d 367, 370-71 (111. App. Ct. 2009) ("In the absence of a conflict in the relevant laws of the two
states, the law of the forum state applies.... As the parties seeking a choice-of-law declaration, it was
the defendants' burden to present evidence establishing that such a declaration was necessary."); Akro-
Plastics v. Drake Indus., 685 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("Local law applies if the party
alleging that the law of a foreign jurisdiction applies fails to demonstrate a conflict between local law
and the law of that jurisdiction.").
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A default rule favoring federal law is counterintuitive because diversi-
ty cases by definition generally do not involve claims that arise under fed-
eral law and thus courts must usually apply some state law.53 But the ap-
plicability of these state laws will often be obvious. The default affects
outcomes only where prioritization issues are close or hidden. In those
cases, defaulting to federal law is efficient and promotes federal interests
without undermining substantial state interests.
Defaulting to federal law would be more efficient than current prac-
tice. 4 Current jurisprudence implementing Erie does not use the terminol-
ogy of defaults. However, a common judicial mantra is that federal courts
adjudicating diversity or supplemental claims "apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law."55 This way of thinking in effect creates two
prioritization defaults: one for substantive law and one for procedural law
(although in practice current doctrine also considers whether a law is made
by judges or by Congress, independent of whether the law is substantive or
procedural). 6 The problem is that drawing a line between substance and
procedure is "notoriously shadowy."57  Default rules are alluring in part
because they provide an opportunity to avoid unnecessary complexity, so a
default framed in terms of an indeterminate line is counterproductive.
Accordingly, as counterintuitive as it may seem, federal courts adjudi-
cating claims arising under state law should apply a default rule favoring
the prioritization of federal law. The default can be easily overcome when
state law obviously applies and can be overcome with greater effort when
the court or a party identifies a good reason to believe that state law should
govern a particular issue. The next question for a court to consider would
be: what constitutes a good reason for preferring state law in close cases? I
consider that question in other work, where I contend that courts should
focus on the scope of federal rules to determine whether they displace in-
consistent state rules.55
53 Diversity claims can arise under federal law in rare instances when federal question jurisdiction
is unavailable. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.)
(holding that a federal court could exercise diversity jurisdiction over a claim under the federal Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act, which divests federal question jurisdiction); see generally Ann
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77,
89-98 (1997) (discussing historical role of diversity jurisdiction as a mechanism for litigating federal
questions in federal court).
54 I discuss current prioritization rules more thoroughly in Erbsen, Pedigree, supra note 9.
55 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460,465 (1965).
56 See Erbsen, Pedigree, supra note 9.
57 Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking:
The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 461,
461-62 (1997) ("many legitimate rules of court have substantive consequences, just as much substantive
law has procedural implications") (footnotes omitted).
58 See Erbsen, Pedigree, supra note 9.
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B. Creation: The Proponent of Federal Common Law Must Justify its
Application
Erie analysis requires a different default when a court addresses the
creation of federal law rather than its prioritization. For the sake of brevity,
I will focus here on the creation of federal common law by federal courts.
Similar analysis also applies to the creation and judicial review of statutes
and treaties, but with additional complexities. 9
A federal court's inquiry into whether it can create federal common
law has two potential starting points: (1) federal courts cannot create federal
common law absent an affirmative justification; or (2) federal courts can
create federal common law absent a challenge to their lawmaking authori-
ty.60 As with the prioritization inquiry, the choice between competing crea-
tion defaults is likely to affect outcomes only in difficult cases where the
scope of federal judicial authority might be either overlooked or closely
contested.
In the context of thinking about defaults, the creation and prioritization
inquiries differ in three material respects. First, the creation inquiry cannot
rely on the prioritization inquiry's assumption that a potentially applicable
federal rule exists because the creation inquiry is the source of that later
assumption. Erie's creation component requires lawmakers to consider
whether they possess authority to create particular federal rules. Only if
such authority is present can the prioritization inquiry later assume that a
valid federal law is available to govern a disputed issue.
Second, because the creation inquiry requires courts to justify the ex-
istence rather than the priority of federal law, it raises more difficult ques-
tions about federalism and separation of powers. In the creation context,
Erie considers the scope of federal authority in a system of divided sover-
eignty and the scope of judicial authority in a system of separated powers.
These constraints make Erie an obstacle to federal and judicial action, such
59 See Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6. There is no judicial remedy for a violation of Erie's
limits on Congress's ability to create federal law until after a plaintiff raises a justiciable challenge, so in
practice the application of Erie to legislation occurs in the context ofjudicial review rather than during
the lawmaking process. Nevertheless, legislators take an oath that arguably requires considering consti-
tutional limits on their authority-including any limits derived from Erie if those limits have a constitu-
tional foundation--even without judicial intervention. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("Senators and
Representatives ... shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."); Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1697, 1697 n.20 (2011) (noting debate
between "departmentalists" and "judicial supremacists" regarding the Supreme Court's "power to bind
the political braches").
60 This section focuses on the creation of "federal common law" in the traditional sense of laws
that are "supreme" and under which federal question suits may "arise." U.S. CONST. arts. Ill, § 2, VI;
see also Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6 (discussing potential justifications for federal common
law). This sort of lawmaking is distinct from pre-Erie efforts by federal courts to fashion binding rules
of"general" law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938).
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that the creation of federal law and federal common law require an initial
defense.6 Although the Supreme Court has not framed this need for a de-
fense in terms of defaults, it has counseled courts to consider the justifica-
tion for judicial lawmaking before creating federal common law.62 A simi-
lar sentiment applies to legislation, albeit with greater deference to the
choices of a politically accountable branch of government.63
Third, a creation default cannot fully share a prioritization default's
concern about efficiency. The prioritization inquiry focuses in part on re-
solving thousands of disputes in an adversarial system in which federal law
is available and difficult conflicts with state law should stand out. A priori-
tization default can therefore aspire to efficiency even as it considers other
values in close cases. Yet favoring the creation of federal law simply to
promote efficient decisionmaking would be normatively unsound in light of
the federalism and separation of powers concerns limiting the scope of fed-
eral law. The possibility that a federal common law or statutory rule may
resolve a regulatory problem more efficiently than would a state rule might
be a factor in determining whether a federal rule is available, but it cannot
be the only factor.'4
The foregoing distinctions suggest that when federal courts consider
whether they may create common law to govern a particular problem, the
default should be that judicial lawmaking is inappropriate absent considera-
61 Erie may also serve other goals, but at a minimum it requires thinking carefully about the
allocation of power between different levels of government and different government institutions. See
generally Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6.
62 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (noting that federal common
law is an exception to Erie's "general[]" limit on judicial lawmaking authority and emphasizing the
need for restraint in crafting common law rules); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 641 (198 1) (stating that "the existence of Congressional authority under Art. I" does not "mean that
federal courts are free to develop a common law to govern those areas until Congress acts"); United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812) (rejecting existence of a federal com-
mon law crime because "judicial power . . . is a constituent part" of "concessions from the several
states-whatever is not expressly given to the [federal government], the latter expressly reserve").
63 See Nat'l Fed'n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) ("The Federal Govern-
ment has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still must show that a constitutional
grant of power authorizes each of its actions.").
64 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("the fact that a given law or procedure is effi-
cient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it
is contrary to the Constitution"); id. at 959 ("The choices we discern as having been made in the Consti-
tutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient,
even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made..."); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Rela-
tions Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 491 (1954) ("[T]he mere complexity of
the legal system for purposes of comprehensive summary is seen to be irrelevant. For legal and gov-
ernmental systems are not designed for simple ease of nutshell description any more than for ease of
central command. The systems are to be judged from the point of view neither of officials nor of expos-
itors but from that of the people whose activities they are supposed to facilitate.").
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tion of the principles (whatever they may be)65 underlying Erie's limits on
federal judicial power. This assumption that federal courts should not cre-
ate federal law without an affirmative justification enforces a normative
constraint on federal judicial power by allocating the burden of persuasion
to the proponent of federal law. In practice, this burden will be easy to car-
ry when judicial power rests on settled precedent governing established
enclaves of federal common law. But closer analysis will be necessary
when addressing assertions of judicial authority in novel contexts or con-
sidering extensions of settled authority past established boundaries. Federal
common law may still be appropriate in these new contexts,66 but its propri-
ety cannot be assumed.67
The proposed default is consistent with current jurisprudence counsel-
ing courts to be cautious when creating or extending federal common law.68
Introducing the terminology of defaults ties the creation problem into Erie's
other components and highlights how courts must consider who has the
burden of persuasion, what counts as a persuasive argument, and the weight
of each argument.
C. Adoption: Replacing Klaxon's Irrebuttable Requirement for State
Choice of Law Rules with a Rebuttable Default that Permits Federal
Choice ofLaw Rules in Appropriate Circumstances
Erie's adoption component currently relies on an essentially
irrebuttable rule that might benefit from conversion into a rebuttable de-
fault. The adoption inquiry proceeds from two related premises. First, a
court with jurisdiction needs to find law from an appropriate source. Se-
cond, all law comes from either a federal source or a nonfederal source.69
When Erie's three other components conclude that federal law either does
not exist or cannot apply, the adoption component considers which nonfed-
eral source fills the void. Historically, federal courts often relied on "gen-
65 See infra note 101 (discussing how uncertainty about Erie's foundations complicates its imple-
mentation).
66 See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 555-60 (2008) (discuss-
ing the role of federal common law in regulating interstate relationships).
67 This section considered how courts should decide whether they can create federal common law.
If federal common law is available, courts would then need to determine the optimal content of federal
common law rules. A default rule might be helpful in this second creation context. See infra text ac-
companying notes 81-84 (discussing how courts decide whether to create uniform federal common law
rules in lieu of incorporating state law); cf Hart, supra note 64, at 529 (addressing the related problem
of whether courts should fill gaps in federal statutes by "adopt[ing]" state law).
68 See supra note 62.
69 For a more detailed account of the adoption inquiry's assumptions, see Erbsen, Four Functions,
supra note 6.
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eral law" when federal law was unavailable.7" Erie foreclosed that option
and therefore required developing a mechanism for choosing an authorita-
tive nonfederal law.71
The Klaxon rule embodies the modem alternative to reflexively invok-
ing general law by instead requiring federal courts to invoke the choice of
law doctrine of the state in which the federal action is pending.72 Local
choice of law rules in turn might select law from a particular state, foreign
law, international law, or even general law.73  The fact that applying the
forum state's law would make little sense-either because the forum state
has a tenuous connection to the dispute or would select law from a seem-
ingly disinterested extrinsic source-is not a basis for circumventing Klax-
on.
74
I have criticized Klaxon elsewhere,75 as have many other scholars.76
There is no need to rehash these critiques here. It suffices to observe that
the Klaxon rule rests on a rickety foundation for at least two reasons: it may
be imprudent as a matter of policy and unjustified as a matter of theory.
70 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1, 18 19 (1842) (distinguishing questions "dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and
permanent operation" from "questions of a more general nature," such as "questions of general com-
mercial law").
71 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75-79. For a discussion of general law's modem relevance, see Erbsen,
Four Functions, supra note 6; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford Clark, General Law in Federal Court,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2013).
72 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). The rule has only
narrow exceptions and otherwise "appears completely immune from attack." 19 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4506 (2d ed. 2010).
73 An interesting question is whether Klaxon would require respecting a state choice of law rule
that selected religious law as a rule of decision. Cf Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 131
(1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Erie and Klaxon might require a federal court to respect
a state's choice "allowing ecclesiastical law to govern" a particular dispute). For a discussion of how
law that does not originate from state actors challenges conventional choice of law methodologies, see
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011); Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The
State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005).
74 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (applying Mississippi's statute of limita-
tions to a claim by a Pennsylvania resident against a Delaware corporation based on an injury in Penn-
sylvania; the plaintiff had sued in Mississippi to avoid Pennsylvania's statute of limitations and then
obtained a transfer to Pennsylvania); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) ("A
federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications
which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the
State in which the federal court sits.").
75 See Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6.
76 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 693 (1984) ("We recognize
that Klaxon has been widely criticized and that learned scholars have suggested on the basis of policy




Any new insight into Klaxon's potential weaknesses can therefore be help-
ful in an ongoing debate about its viability.
For present purposes, Klaxon is interesting because it avoids consider-
ing default rules despite their potential utility. The adoption inquiry at first
glance appears unable to rely on a default because privileging a single law-
maker would be impossible. One cannot plausibly contend, for example,
that North Dakota law presumptively governs every diversity dispute for
which federal law is not available. But even if courts cannot default to a
particular lawmaker, they can default to a methodology for selecting the
appropriate source of law. Selecting an appropriate default (and the cir-
cumstances under which it can be rebutted) is important because competing
methodologies implicate different values and produce different outcomes.
If the Court were writing on a clean slate, the adoption inquiry could
take one of three basic forms: it could promote horizontal uniformity, verti-
cal uniformity, or a hybrid of both. First, federal courts could rely on na-
tionally uniform criteria to select nonfederal governing law. For example,
courts might develop a uniquely federal choice of law standard or borrow
an existing standard, such as the Second Restatement's multifactored test.77
Either way, the answer to the question "which nonfederal law applies?"
would be identical in every federal district for any given set of facts. The
rule would thus be horizontally uniform--i.e., uniform across states, setting
aside variations in how individual judges exercise discretion. Second, fed-
eral courts could apply a vertically uniform rule, meaning that the choice of
law inquiry in federal court would mirror the inquiry in a local state court
and thus be uniform within the state. That is the approach in Klaxon."5
Third, a hybrid approach would generally seek vertical uniformity, but
would contain criteria for switching to a nationally uniform standard in
appropriate circumstances. For example, the forum state's choice of law
rules might yield to federal rules in cases implicating strong federal inter-
ests in regulating disputes involving foreign parties or foreign conduct.79
The hybrid approach is a textbook example of a default rule. It posits
that a particular outcome is generally preferable (vertical uniformity), rec-
ognizes that an alternative outcome (horizontal uniformity) might be appro-
priate in some cases, and thus defaults to the preferred outcome while
providing criteria for identifying outlier cases that overcome the default.
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (197 1).
78 Vertical uniformity can be elusive in practice because state and federal courts may not reach the
same conclusions when there is no controlling precedent governing a difficult legal question. Cf Nolan
v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) (stating that a diversity court
must "determine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought").
79 See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress Ill, When Erie Goes International, 105 Nw. L. REV. 1531, 1574
(2012) (contending that in diversity cases with an international component "the role of the federal court
should be to critically evaluate whether the application of a state's conflict-of-laws rule supports federal
objectives").
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One can quibble over whether the default should be sticky or relatively easy
to overcome. But the alluring benefits of both vertical and horizontal uni-
formity suggest that a rule entirely abandoning one in favor of the other
might be less desirable than a nuanced hybrid relying on a rebuttable de-
fault.
A striking feature of Klaxon is that it endorses vertical uniformity ra-
ther than horizontal uniformity or a hybrid/default approach with virtually
no analysis. The Klaxon Court seemed to think that its holding followed
inexorably from Erie when in fact Erie granted more discretion than Klaxon
acknowledged." Klaxon therefore implicitly rejected the hybrid/default
approach without carefully considering any of the questions one might ex-
pect a court to ask before selecting one of three competing approaches to
choice of law. Examples of potentially fruitful inquiries that Klaxon skirted
include: whether states have a legitimate interest in having federal courts
mimic their choice of law standards; whether there are countervailing fed-
eral interests; whether litigants (especially repeat players who participate in
a national market) have relevant interests that should shape the choice of
law inquiry; whether judicially administrable criteria are available for im-
plementing a hybrid rule; and whether a materially significant difference in
outcomes would occur with sufficient frequency to justify the effort of cre-
ating a hybrid rule rather than adopting a bright-line preference for state
law.
Reasonable minds can differ about whether the answers to these ques-
tions support or undermine the Klaxon rule. But thinking about Erie's
adoption inquiry in the context of default rules highlights how Klaxon over-
looks the possibility of using a rebuttable default rule rather than a fixed
rule for the adoption inquiry. That omission is troubling given the utility of
defaults in the prioritization, creation, and interpretation components of
Erie analysis.
Klaxon's blindness to the potential hybrid/default approach contrasts
starkly with the Court's approach to a related problem in the creation con-
text involving the uniformity of federal common law rules. Suppose that a
court concludes that it may create a federal common law rule to govern a
particular problem. The rule can take either of two forms. It can be nation-
ally uniform, such that it has the same content in every state. Or the rule
can borrow from state law, such that the content of the rule is a function of
a dispute's geographic features (for example, where an accident occurred,
where the litigants reside, where the suit was filed, etc.). The recurring
need to choose between uniformity and localization raises the possibility of
adopting a default to guide judicial discretion. That is exactly what the
Court did in United States v. Kimbell Foods.' The Court's default assump-
80 Klaxon claims to "extend[]" Erie without explaining why Erie compels the holding. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941); see also Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6.
81 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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tion is that incorporating state law into federal common law is generally
appropriate, but this default can yield to strong reasons for preferring a uni-
form national rule.
82
Klaxon and Kimbell Foods seem to address an identical problem in-
consistently. In both cases, the Court was creating a federal common law
methodology governing choice of law.83 The two contexts both require
considering whether federal common law should be horizontally or vertical-
ly uniform. Yet Kimbell Foods adopted a hybrid/defaults approach, while
Klaxon categorically favored incorporating state law. There may be sound
reasons for the difference in approaches, 84 but they are not self-evident.
The Court has never explained why Kimbell Foods used a different ap-
proach than Klaxon; indeed, the Court has never even cited the two cases in
82 See id. at 728-29 (considering the need for "uniformity," whether state law would "frustrate
specific [federal] objectives," and "the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt com-
mercial relationships predicated on state law"); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 628 (6th ed. 2009) (characterizing
Kimbell Foods as creating a "presumption" favoring incorporation of state law); Michael C. Dorf, Dy-
namic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2008) ("in exercising its power to
fashion federal common law in discrete areas of federal concern, the courts presumptively define the
content of federal law as state law").
83 See Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6 (explaining why Klaxon is a form of federal common
law).
84 For example, perhaps the Kimbell Foods context requires greater flexibility because courts must
create a wide variety of federal common law rules, while a bright-line approach is more appropriate for
the Klaxon context to address a single frequently recurring problem (albeit one that arises in many
distinct factual circumstances). From this perspective, Klaxon would be an issue-specific implementa-
tion of Kimbell Foods rather than a departure from Kimbell Foods. Nevertheless, the fact that Klaxon's
preference for national uniformity is irrebuttable in all of the myriad circumstances where federal courts
must adopt nonfederal law still seems inconsistent with the more context-sensitive methodology in
Kimbell Foods.
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the same opinion.85 Commentators likewise have not attempted to reconcile
the decisions.86
Klaxon's failure to consider the hybrid/defaults option is another crack
in its threadbare armor. Further scholarship about Klaxon might profitably
explore whether a flexible defaults-based approach would be superior to
mandatory reliance on forum choice of law rules. 7
D. Interpretation: The Need for an "Erie Canon" to Determine Whether
the Scope of Federal Law Should be Read Broadly or Narrowly to
Minimize Conflicts with State Law
Erie's interpretation component is another vexing source of confusion
that would benefit from a default rule. The scope of a federal rule is often
the central disputed issue in Erie cases," yet the Court has tied itself in
85 One case cites to Klaxon and Kimbell Foods in different opinions without any effort to compare
or contrast them. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 290 n.24 (2008) (citing Kimbell Foods, 440
U.S. 715); id. at 307 n.3 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487). An issue in Danforth
was whether state courts could rely on state law to give retroactive effect to newly created federal con-
stitutional rights when federal law would not apply the rights retroactively. The Court held that federal
courts should not impose a federal common law rule preempting state remedies. See Danforth, 552 U.S.
at 289-90. In contrast, the dissent argued that federal law governing retroactivity in effect created a
choice of law rule barring state courts from applying new law to old cases. See id. at 307-10 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). The majority thus implicitly framed the problem as relating to Erie's creation compo-
nent-i.e., whether federal law should create an exclusive remedy or leave room for additional state
remedies. But the dissent implicitly framed the problem as relating to Erie's interpretation compo-
nent-i.e., whether the issue of remedies was within the scope of existing federal law governing retroac-
tivity. Closer attention to distinctions between Erie's components would have highlighted how the
competing positions differed, which in turn could have suggested additional perspectives for evaluating
their merit.
86 One scholar has noted the relevance of Kimbell Foods to the problem of designing a federal
common law choice of law rule for "cases raising international issues." Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out
the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 508-09 (2002) (observing that
the federal rule should conform to Kimbell Foods by borrowing state rules absent a "significant conflict
with specific federal interests").
87 For discussion of potential alternatives to Klaxon in particular contexts, see Childress, supra
note 79 at 1573-79 (disputes with international components); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of
Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2027-34 (2008) (nationwide class actions after
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
88 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) ("The first question must
therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before
the Court."); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437-39
(2010) (interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 23); Kermit Roosevelt II1, Choice of Law in Federal Courts, From
Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) ("The court's task ... is
first to determine the scope of the different sovereigns' laws .... ").
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knots trying to explain how to determine that scope.89 A default rule could
streamline doctrine while advancing Erie's normative goals.
The interpretation inquiry is relevant when federal law purports to ad-
dress a disputed issue. For example, assume that Erie's creation component
validates a particular federal rule. Further assume that Erie's prioritization
component deems that federal rule to trump an otherwise applicable state
law in the context of a pending case. Those two assumptions do not alone
mean that the federal rule will apply in lieu of the state rule. A question
remains about whether the federal rule's scope encompasses the disputed
issue. If not, then the federal rule is irrelevant; there is no conflict with the
otherwise applicable state law. Accordingly, knowing whether a federal
rule applies under Erie requires interpreting the rule. Regardless of the
federal rule's origin-whether from the Constitution, treaty, statute, regula-
tion, procedural code, or federal common law-courts must know what the
federal rule means.
Defaults are common when interpreting the scope of legal rules.9"
These defaults--often called canons-help courts determine the meaning of
ambiguous texts.9  Commentators disagree about whether particular de-
faults are sensible, but there is little doubt that defaults can be a useful ana-
lytical tool when carefully crafted and prudently applied.92
89 See Erbsen, Four Functions, supra note 6 (discussing inconsistent modem precedents interpret-
ing the FRCP).
90 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B (4th ed. 2007)
(categorizing dozens of canons).
91 1 am treating canons as a species of default rules that apply when courts interpret statutes and
similar texts. One can imagine a different nomenclature in which default rules are an especially sticky
species of canon. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism
Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166, 169
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) ("A default rule ... is stronger than a canon of
interpretation .... [It] function[s] like a clear statement rule-a principle that dictates a result unless
Congress overrides the outcome with a specified degree of clarity.").
92 Among the benefits of interpretative defaults (if used wisely) are promoting efficiency by
avoiding the need to repeatedly reconsider how to handle recurring sources of ambiguity, minimizing
arbitrary decisionmaking by structuring judicial discretion, maximizing the probability that the inter-
preter reaches a justifiable result, signaling to rulemakers how their work will be understood and thus
how it should to be written to convey an intended meaning, articulating norms that might shape the
content of rules by encouraging drafters to consider the consequences of textual choices, and linking the
interpretative enterprise to broader jurisprudential commitments. A large and rich literature discusses
the potential virtues and vices of interpretative defaults. For an introduction to the debate, see EINER
ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008) (develop-
ing a theory of how defaults might produce optimal outcomes); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (illustrating how the availability of canons and countercanons gov-
erning the same issue can invite subjectivity into the interpretative enterprise); Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (considering
whether Congress rather than the judiciary should create rules governing statutory interpretation);
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Although defaults often focus on ambiguities arising from grammar
and word choice, they can also be used to enforce normative constraints on
the scope of a rulemaker's power within a system that fragments regulatory
authority.93 Examples of such defaults include the constitutional avoidance
canon (which reads statutes narrowly to avoid potential constitutional in-
firmities),94 the canon favoring a narrow interpretation of judge-made feder-
al rules that might exceed the rulemaking authority delegated in the Rules
Enabling Act,95 and clear statement requirements that skew toward narrow
interpretations of federal statutes that might undermine state interests.96
Defaults even exist to manage conflicts of law in a federal system. For
example, courts might interpret a federal rule broadly or narrowly to invite
or avoid preemption of potentially inconsistent state rules,97 and courts
might adopt default choice of law rules that Congress can modify in appro-
priate circumstances.98 These and similar defaults all function as thumbs on
Bertrall L. Ross 11, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2011) (assessing
interpretative defaults in the context of tension between competing normative preferences animating
judicial and legislative actors); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (reviewing distinct interpretative methods); Ernest A. Young, The Continuity
of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1373
(2010) (considering how "structural values" animating the Constitution inform statutory interpretation).
93 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
924 (2013) (distinguishing between "textual" and "substantive" canons).
94 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corp. of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (inter-
preting a statute "as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by" a
competing interpretation).
95 See Amehem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997) (holding that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23 "must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act"). For a discus-
sion of whether substantive canons can aid in resolving disputes about the scope of FRCP provisions,
see Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 AKRON L. REV.
1067 (2011); Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the
Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 187 (2013).
96 See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1661 (2011) (abrogation of state sovereign
immunity requires a "clear statement from Congress"); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
65 (1989) (discussing rationale for clear statement rules that protect state interests). For a discussion of
whether clear statement rules are consistent with specific constitutional clauses and values, see John F.
Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010).
97 See Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination,
11l MICH. L. REV. 647, 654-55 (2013) (categorizing competing presumptions). Judicial abstention can
serve a related coordination function by allocating interpretative authority between state and federal
courts when issues implicate both state and federal law. See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 501 (1941) (holding that a federal court may abstain from deciding a federal constitutional question
that a state court's resolution of a state law question would avoid).
98 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468, 1531 (2007) (contending that Article IV creates "default" constraints on interstate choice of law
that Congress can alter); Young, supra note 86, at 503 ("The debate about customary international law
[in the choice of law context] is generally about default rules. Whatever the usual status of customary
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the scale favoring normatively preferred outcomes when other interpretative
factors are roughly indeterminate.9
Erie's interpretation inquiry may benefit from a default similarly im-
bued with normative preferences about the optimal interaction between
state and federal law. Implementing Erie's interpretation component re-
quires asking whether a federal rule should be read broadly or narrowly to
encompass or avoid a disputed issue.' In close cases where the rule is
susceptible to both interpretations, the norms animating Erie might skew
the interpretative conclusion. If one believes that Erie primarily exists to
promote federalism values by limiting federal interference with state law,
then one might default to a narrow interpretation. If instead one views Erie
as primarily concerned with the proper allocation of lawmaking authority
between federal institutions, then there is less need to cabin federal laws
that have already survived scrutiny under Erie's creation component. Other
theories of Erie's normative purposes might further favor skewing interpre-
tation toward a broad or narrow reading.'0'
Identifying an appropriate default--or an "Erie canon"-requires con-
sidering several questions that are ripe for further scholarship. First, a de-
norms in the hierarchy of American law, Congress retains the power under Article I to federalize them
or, in the exercise of its other powers, to relieve the states of any obligation of compliance.").
99 Evolution of the Court's normative commitments alters the range of permissible defaults. For
example, before Erie, federal courts interpreting unsettled state law often adopted a "default" assump-
tion that state law was consistent with "general law" principles. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner -
Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1283
(2000). This default enabled federal judges to create "a uniform but nonfederal body of public law and
constitutional law" to constrain state regulatory authority. Id. at 1321. Erie's emphasis on the distinc-
tion between state, federal, and general law required a new interpretative approach.
too A similar need to choose between broad and narrow interpretations arises when federal courts
assess the scope of state law. The difference is that the appropriate method for interpreting federal law
is clearly a question of federal law, while the appropriate method for interpreting state law might itself
be a question of state law. Federal judges applying Erie may therefore have more flexibility to skew the
interpretation of federal law based on principles drawn from Erie than they do when interpreting state
law. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as Law and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L. 1898, 1906-07 (2011) (advocating a "default rule" requiring that "federal
courts should apply state rules of statutory interpretation to state law questions" absent a reason to
believe that federal law displaces state interpretative preferences). But cf Campos, supra note 16, at
1628-30 (suggesting that federal courts could interpret state law using default rules that encourage states
to distinguish substantive and procedural rules; these defaults appear to be federal common law rules for
interpreting state statutes).
101 There is no consensus about what purposes Erie serves and which provisions of the Constitu-
tion animate the decision. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1289, 1289 (2007) (observing that Erie's "constitutional rationale ... has remained elusive for almost
seventy years"). The optimal default might hinge on which values are relevant in particular contexts.
For example, if a strong tradition supports federal uniformity with respect to a particular regulatory field
(such as foreign relations) then a default might favor broadly interpreting federal rules in that field.
Similarly, in regulatory fields where federal lawmakers were unlikely to have intended to displace state
law in diversity cases, defaulting to a narrower interpretation might be appropriate.
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fault is sensible only if it furthers an appropriate norm, so courts would
need a more precise account of Erie's norms than current jurisprudence
provides. Identifying a guiding norm will determine whether courts should
err in favor of construing federal statutes broadly or narrowly to embrace or
avoid conflict with otherwise applicable state laws. The answer might dif-
fer depending on the subject being regulated (e.g., primary conduct or be-
havior during litigation) and the source of federal law (e.g., treaty, statute,
rule or common law). Developing an Erie canon would thus entail a more
systematic treatment of the interpretative questions that the Supreme Court
already considers in its preemption jurisprudence."2 Second, to the extent
that defaults operate as a thumb on the scale favoring a particular outcome,
courts must decide how heavy a thumb to wield. Finally, defaults are tools
for resolving ambiguity, which raises a question about how courts can de-
termine when a rule's scope is sufficiently ambiguous to justify skewing
interpretation toward a broad or narrow reading.0 3
CONCLUSION
Erie will never be easy to understand and implement, but it need not
remain the befuddling muddle that it has become. Fragmenting Erie into its
components and identifying defaults to guide each distinct inquiry can help
to refine choice of law analysis and highlight relevant norms. The initial
sketch of default rules in this article provides a foundation and blueprint for
further scholarship exploring when federal courts may apply federal law
and how they select alternatives.
102 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 942 (discussing "federalism-enforcing canons,"
including "clear statement rules" and the "presumption against preemption"). For recent efforts to
consider how Erie might influence interpretative canons in particular contexts, see Abbe R. Gluck, The
Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Eriefor the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
753 (2013) (treating canons as a form of federal common law and considering how Erie limits their
creation and application); Thomas, supra note 95 (proposing rules for interpreting FRCP provisions that
might conflict with state law).
103 See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quipping that "ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder").
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